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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
Acquisition decisions drive resource requirements that are spread widely across the 
Department of Defense (DoD). DoD policy and Federal statute call for using the Fully 
Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) in cost estimates in Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) 
that support acquisition decision making so that decisions reflect all of the costs 
throughout the DoD organization that will be incurred (or saved) by a given 
acquisition decision. An Economic Input/Output (EIO) model of the DoD organization 
could be used to estimate the unit-specific FBCF, capturing all higher-order effects 
as demand is propagated through a complex and nonlinear supply chain. The model 
would produce unit-specific estimates of the cost and DoD-wide fuel requirements 
associated with a marginal change in fuel requirements in any unit of the 
organization. This paper describes the feasibility and potential benefits of an EIO 
model of DoD fuel supply. 
Introduction 
Acquisition decisions drive resource requirements that are spread widely across 
Department of Defense (DoD) organizational components. These decisions include 
Analyses of Alternatives (AoA) and Milestone decisions supported by Life Cycle Cost 
Estimates (LCCE). An important component of LCCE is energy usage (primarily fuel) during 
the Operating and Support phase.  To provide more realistic cost estimates of fuel, the DoD 
has mandated use of “fully burdened cost of fuel” (FBCF).  The purpose of this research 
effort is to evaluate the feasibility of developing an Economic Input/Output (EIO) model of 
the DoD organization to estimate the FBCF and thereby to support acquisition decisions. 
DoD fuel usage creates risk by tethering deployed forces to a long and costly supply 
chain and by making the DoD strategically dependent on foreign oil sources. DoD policy and 
Federal statute call for using the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel (FBCF) in cost estimates in 
Analyses of Alternatives (AoAs) that support acquisition decisions so that these decisions 
reflect all of the costs throughout the DoD organization that will be incurred (or saved) by a 
given acquisition decision. One of the challenges in estimating the FBCF is that a reduction 
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(increase) in fuel requirement in one part of the organization has a cascading effect because 
it reduces (increases) demands on supporting organizations, multiplying the effect of a 
change in usage along the transportation supply chain getting the fuel to its point of use. 
Current FBCF models do not capture this multiplier effect, with the result that the true cost of 
fuel is underestimated. 
Economic Input/Output (EIO) earned the Nobel Prize in economics for its creator, W. 
Leontief (Leontief, 1986), but it is a fairly simple model. Usually applied to a national 
economy, using industries and sub-industries as the unit of analysis, EIO produces a 
general equilibrium model, so that the impact of marginal changes in one sector can be 
propagated and measured through the rest of the economy. The research literature is rich 
with applications to Life Cycle Assessment, which is the estimation of the environmental 
impacts of the consumption of products and services traced back through a complex supply 
chain (Hendrickson, Lave, & Matthews, 2006). An EIO system for the DoD would have 
organizational units as sectors (which we call components), and marginal changes in output 
or input requirements in one component could be propagated through the entire system to 
estimate the net effects on the entire organization. 
The primary benefits of EIO are its ability to capture all higher-order effects of a 
change in one part of the organization and the ability to trace resource-specific requirements 
throughout the system. For example, an EIO system could estimate not only the total costs 
of FBCF (specific to every organizational unit) but also the total DoD-wide reduction in fuel 
demand associated with a reduction of one gallon of fuel in a given unit. The EIO method 
can be used to capture the costs of force protection. 
In the context of FBCF, an EIO system could be used to develop a more credible 
value for FBCF by producing an estimate of the DoD-wide effect of reducing (or increasing) 
fuel or power demand.  The estimated FBCF would be specific to an organizational unit, as 
appropriate because the requirements involved in providing a gallon of fuel differ across 
organizational units, depending in particular on the supply chain that sustains the unit. 
The section FBCF Using Unit Costs vs. EIO Estimate uses a simple example to 
show how the EIO approach can be adapted to model the DoD fuel supply chain and 
illustrate the multiplier effect. The Modeling the Supply Chain with EIO section provides a 
formal EIO model for DoD fuel supply and shows examples of the calculations. The section 
Feasibility Considerations discusses feasibility and challenges of the approach, and the final 
section concludes with a discussion of the potential advantages and disadvantages of EIO 
relative to scenario-based approaches to estimating the FBCF. 
FBCF Using Unit Costs vs. EIO Estimate 
Consider a very simple model of a supply chain that provides fuel to a single 
warfighting unit. We will call the warfighting unit a “component,” where a component is the 
organizational subunit that is directly modeled, equivalent to an industry or sector in 
classical EIO. The supply chain includes three logistical stages, each of which is a 
component as well as the end user component that uses the fuel in warfighting. 
Fuel delivered is the total number of units (here, gallons) of fuel that each stage 
delivers to its customers. In this example, the supply chain is linear, so each stage has 
exactly one supplier (the prior stage, or, in the case of Stage 1, an external purchase) and 
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Fuel operating costs exclude the cost of the delivered fuel. It includes the cost of the 
fuel consumed by this component in providing its services calculated at the official Defense 
Energy Support Center (DESC) standard price, which in this example is $2/gallon. The other 
(non-fuel) costs include operating and support (O&S) costs, depreciation, infrastructure and 
recapitalization, and infrastructure—everything attributable to the logistical component and 
capturing cost elements 2-5 in the FBCF methodology (Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel 
Calculator, version 7, Model Description & Assumptions, March 2010).1 
The naive application of the FBCF calculation for the logistical support would 
attribute the unit cost of delivered fuel by each supply-chain component to a unit of fuel 
provided to the consuming component. Table 1 shows an example calculation; the FBCF 
estimated cost of the supply chain per gallon of fuel delivered to the warfighter component is 
$4.45, the sum of the unit operating costs of the three supply-chain components. Adding the 
$2/gallon DESC price, this comes to an estimate of $6.45 for the FBCF. This would be 
appropriate in a one-stage linear supply chain. However, it doesn’t work in a multistage 
supply chain. 






(% of delivered) Non-Fuel Fuel Total
Stage 1 1560 15% 1,532$    468$       2,000$    1.28$           
Stage 2 1200 30% 1,280$    720$       2,000$    1.67$           
Stage 3 1000 20% 1,100$    400$       1,500$    1.50$           






Figure 1 shows the multiplier effect on the total quantity of fuel required at each 
stage (note that it does not show costs). Because Stage 3 requires 0.2 extra gallons of fuel 
for every gallon it delivers, then to deliver 1,000 gallons of fuel, it must receive 1,200 gallons 
from Stage 2. If the fuel demand from the warfighter were reduced by a gallon, then Stage 3 
would have to receive 1.2 gallons less, not just 1 gallon less. 
                                                
1 The seven cost elements are: 
1. Commodity Cost of Fuel.  
2. Primary Fuel Delivery Asset O&S Cost.   
3. Depreciation Cost of Primary Fuel Delivery Assets.   
4. Direct Fuel Infrastructure O&S and Recapitalization Cost.   
5. Indirect Fuel Infrastructure O&S Cost.  
6. Environmental Cost.  
7. Other Service & Platform Delivery Specific Costs (including force protection). 
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Figure 1. Multiplier Effect in Simple Supply Chain 
In the example in Table 1, the appropriate fully burdened cost of a gallon of fuel 
(hereafter the EIOCF) is the total cost of operating all three supply-chain components 
including the costs of the extra fuel required by each supply-chain component to deliver the 
1,000 gallons of fuel needed by the warfighter plus the fuel required to deliver the extra fuel 
















The total direct fuel cost to transport 1,000 gallons:  $1,300 = 1,000 gallons × (0.15 + 
0.2 + 0.3) × $2/gallon. This is the only fuel cost that would be captured by a naive FBCF 
estimate.  In this example, the total non-fuel cost of the supply chain is $3,912, so the total 
cost of supply chain plus direct cost of 1,000 gallons of fuel is $7,500, and the total cost of 
the supply chain per unit of fuel consumed by the warfighter is $7.50, which we will call the 
EIO cost of fuel (EIOCF).  
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EIOCF = $7.50/gallon. 
The EIOCF of $7.50/gallon contrasts with the FBCF of $6.45 calculated above if the 
multiplier effects are not captured. In this simple example, that is a difference of 
$1.05/gallon, which is 16% of the total cost of the delivered fuel (including non-fuel costs to 
the supply chain) and 29% of the fuel costs of the delivered fuel.  
If we assume that, like fuel costs, the non-fuel costs of the supply chain components 
are proportional to the quantity of fuel that each component delivers, then the EIOCF is the 
marginal cost of a gallon of fuel delivered to the warfighter. In the example in Table 1, 
increasing the quantity demanded by the warfighter to 1,001 gallons would increase the total 
cost of the supply chain to $7,507.50. Therefore, the EIOCF is the appropriate cost to use in 
decisions—acquisition decisions, operational decisions, even force planning decisions—that 
can affect warfighter fuel requirements. The naive FBCF underestimates the marginal cost 
of a gallon of fuel consumption. 
While it is certainly possible for an analyst to estimate the multiplier effects when 
conducting a FBCF analysis, it would be difficult as it requires estimating the amount of fuel 
that a unit transports that is destined for the end user rather than other elements of the 
supply chain, and in general at most second-order effects are captured. 
Modeling the Supply Chain with EIO 
Modeling a system using EIO requires first, defining the components or unit of 
analysis, which determines the level of data that will be required to populate the model. 
Second, the model requires a populated matrix of the type shown in Table 2. An EIO model 
is a static snapshot representing the flows of resources among components of the modeled 
system. For national accounts, the snapshot is usually an annual total. For the DoD, an 
annual average or total representation of the supply chain would likely be used and results 
would reflect averages over the period. This section formalizes the model. 
Linear Supply Chain 
Components are indexed i  = 1,…,n , where n  is the warfighter component, and 
1,…, 1n−  are links in the supply chain transporting fuel to component n . Think of 
component i =1 as DESC (DLAE), and each component i <n  directly supplies only 
component 1i + .  Each supply component has precisely one output: delivered fuel. The 
amount of fuel delivered by each component is denoted ix . 
Using the convention of EIO analysis, let ija = the number of units of output from 
component i  required to produce each unit of output from component j . Often, both ija  and 
ix  are normalized in terms of dollars. We will instead assume ija  and ix  are in units of fuel, 
with all fuel treated identically. The exception is nx , the output of the warfighter component, 
which might be steaming hours, patrols performed, or other output measures. 
We will also introduce an external component, indexed X , which represents any 
supplier outside the organization. In our example, this captures purchases of fuel from the 
private sector. In classical EIO, the entire economy is modeled. In some cases, such as 
national accounting, imports are purchases external to the organization.  
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∑ . The input-coefficient 
matrix is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. General Input-Coefficient Matrix 
      destination 
      component 










  1  11a   11a   …  1na  
2 
21a   22a   …  2na  
…  …  …  …  … 
n
1na   2na   …  nna  
  external 
1Xa   2Xa   …  Xna  






x a x i n
=
= ∀ =∑ , 
which means that each component i  produces exactly enough of its output, ix , to satisfy 














.      (1) 
Since we are assuming a very simple supply chain in which component 1 supplies 
component 2 (and no one else) and so on, and the model accounts for exactly one input 
type (fuel), the input coefficient matrix has a special structure: 
2,..., 1i n∀ = − 1, 1i i ia α− = + , and  0ija = ,  1j i∀ ≠ + ,2  
where the value iα  is the amount of fuel consumed by component i  in delivering one unit of 
fuel. It is assumed that the fuel any component consumes is not its own delivered (output) 
fuel, but rather the fuel delivered by the component that supplies it.3 The input-coefficient 
matrix is given in Table 3. 
                                                
2 We will further assume that the units of output from component n  are defined in such a way that 1, 1n na − = , 
although this is for simplicity and is not otherwise required because the output from component n  is of a 
different type than components i < n . 
3 A fuel-supplying component’s efficiency is therefore 11 iα+ . 
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Table 3. Coefficient Matrix for Linear Supply Chain 
      Destination 
      Component 












21 α+ …  0  0 
2  0  0  …  0  0 
…  …  …  …  …  … 
2n−   0  0  …  11 nα −+   0 
1n−   0  0  …  0  1,n na −  
n   0  0  …  0  0 
  External 
1 11Xa α= + 0  …  0  0 
For components i < n , each component’s output (gallons of fuel) is: 





X i n n n
i
x a xα− −
=
= +∏      (2) 




X i n n n
i
x a a xα− −
=
= +∏ , as shown in the example below, with three supply chain 
links (components 1-3) and one warfighter component (4). The warfighter component’s 
output is exogenous, and it is arbitrarily set to 100. The total fuel required by the 
organization is 1.15 × 1.3 × 1.2 × 1,000 = 1,794. 
Table 4. Input Coefficient Matrix for Simple Supply Chain Example 
destination








1 0 1.3 0 0
2 0 0 1.2 0
3 0 0 0 1
4 0 0 0 0
external 1.15 0 0 0
output by component 1560 1200 1000 1000
total external requirement 1794  
For a given component, we will define its fuel multiplier (denoted iβ ) as the factor by 
which the organization’s total fuel requirement from the external source would increase 
(decrease) with a change in the component’s fuel output (either as a result of decreased 
demand from the next stage in the supply chain, or as a result of an increased efficiency) or 
decrease in demand for its product. The EIO approach assumes that changes in input 
requirements are proportional to changes in output (constant returns to scale). Hence, 
 =
=















= −∏ , for any 1,..., 1i n= − implying 








xβ α== = −∏ . 
More Complex Supply Chain 
Within the DoD it is more realistic for a supply chain to include complexities such as: 
 multiple warfighter components; 
 force protection components distinct from warfighting components, which 
produce an output (protection) that warfighting and logistics components may 
use; 
 each component may receive fuel directly from more than one fuel-supply 
component; and 
 nonlinearities (e.g., one component may both supply and be supplied by 
another component). 
In this case, the general matrix in Table 2 is applicable, together with a vector of 
outputs, ix  for all i .  The consistency constraints in Equation 1 still apply. An example is 
shown in Figure 2. 
As before, ija = the number of units of output from component i  required to produce 
each unit of output from component j , and the units are the units of i ’s output over then 
units of j ’s output. This means that ij ja x  is the amount of output of component i  consumed 
by component j  in the same units that component i ’s output is measured. The output of 
force-protection components is also not in units of fuel but rather in units of force protection.  
Additional constraints are required to ensure that each component receives the 
required amount of input of a given type. In particular, if component j  supplies fuel, then the 
total input it receives from all fuel-supplying components must equal 1 jα+ . 
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DoD EIO FBCF Model
•
DLAE is sending 1.2 units of fuel to 
USN Log per unit of USN Log output
USN Log is transporting .5 units to 
AFRICOM per unit  of AFRICOM output
CENTCOM is receiving 1.75 units of fuel 
from USA Log per unit of CENTCOM output
USA Log is providing .4 units of 
fuel to FP per unit of FP output
FP uses its own output, i.e. they provide 
convoy protection / man hours / etc to 
themselves 
EUCOM outputTotal output from DLAE
Amount of fuel units required from 
external sources to produce total 
output from all DoD components
DLAE procures 1.2 units of fuel 
from external sources per unit of 
output from DLAE
 
Figure 2. An Example Implementation of a DoD EIO Model that Includes Multiple 
Warfighter Components (the COCOMS) and Force Protection (FP) 
(Dubbs & Hills, 2011) 
Feasibility Considerations 
The first challenge in this effort is identifying the unit of organization that can serve 
as the element of analysis (which we call component) for a DoD EIO Defense Accounts 
system. This modeling choice represents a tradeoff among data availability, data quality, 
and homogeneity of activities within the selected unit.  The components should be defined 
such that the necessary coefficients can be estimated, but that the output of each 
component is homogenous enough that each unit of output can be treated identically. 
EIO cannot be done piecemeal—it requires a fully populated matrix of the type 
shown in Table 2.  Therefore, to calculate the EIOCF for any unit, it would be necessary to 
implement a DoD-wide EIO system of defense accounts.  This is analogous to national 
accounts in the usual applications of EIO to analyze regional and sector economies (see 
Dietzenbacher & Lahr, 2004 for a history of the development of EIO theory and practice and 
for examples of EIO in national accounting), and therefore can be used in many cost 
estimation applications. A DoD EIO system should be DoD-wide because of the Joint nature 
of supply and logistics. Once such a system is implemented, it could be used to assess the 
impact of marginal changes within any unit in the organization. The computational effort 
required to estimate the impacts of additional marginal changes is negligible. 
All modeling techniques have their limitations. The most relevant in this application of 
EIO are the following: 
1. Data availability is, as always, important.  We believe that the data required 
for this effort are available, but they do reside in several organizations across 
the DoD enterprise.  To capture the net DoD fuel requirement associated with 
fuel consumption in each component, fuel flows across components within 
the DoD need to be estimated. In addition, to provide a dollar estimate of 
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EIOCF, each component’s total costs associated with fuel logistics must be 
estimated. If force protection, a significant part of the burden of fuel supply in 
some operations, is to be included, then the costs associated with each 
component that supplies force protection to the supply chain, as well as the 
component’s fuel requirements and suppliers and the amount of force 
protection output provided to each component, must be estimated. 
2. EIO has assumptions—as do all models—that can limit its applicability.  
Principal among these for EIO is the proportionality assumption.  Therefore, 
defining the unit of analysis (the components) such that proportionality is a 
reasonable assumption will be an important consideration. 
3. EIO is a static snapshot of the modeled system. Especially in active 
operational contexts, the DoD supply chain may be changing frequently, 
sometimes over a matter of days or weeks. EIO allows for a given component 
to receive fuel (or other resources) from multiple supplying components with 
the resulting EIOCF estimates reflecting averages over all paths that fuel 
takes to reach each component. However, if the proportions of fuel change 
significantly, permanently, and frequently, then the static EIO matrix will be an 
inadequate model and provide inaccurate FBCF estimates. 
The EIOCF may provide less precision for a given scenario than an approach that 
requires a detailed study of the particulars of the scenario. However, by definition, any 
detailed scenario is quickly outdated. An EIOCF might be a better estimate than an outdated 
detailed scenario, and may prove a better estimate of the marginal cost of fuel in a fast-
changing or complex supply chain. 
Conclusions 
The up-front costs of populating a DoD-wide model with good data are higher than a 
few single-scenario FBCF studies. However, once the model is developed, it can answer 
questions about the marginal impacts of changes in any component with much less work per 
query. The EIO framework and, if implemented, a populated EIO model of the DoD supply 
chain could also be used to estimate the cost and resource requirements associated with 
any marginal change in output requirements or input mix in any unit of the organization, thus 
becoming a valuable tool to support many acquisition-related decisions. It is worth exploring 
the feasibility of constructing a EIO model of the DoD supply chain because the potential 
benefits for decision support are so great. 
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